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NOTES AND COMMENT
THE RIGHTS OF JAPANESE AND CHINESE ALIENS IN
LAND IN WASHINGTON
Here on the Pacific Coast the question of what rights a Japanese
or Chinese alien can acquire in real property is of vital importance.
A glance into the early law in regards to the rights of aliens in
general will serve as an introduction to the problem. The early
English common law would not allow an alien to hold land because
of the poor policy of permitting the holding of land by one who
owed allegiance to another sovereign. This was evaded by a system
of uses and trusts. The early American law was the same. Again
.a system of trusts was. used but the Virginia court held in 1832
that equity would not enforce such a trust except as a trust for the
benefit of the state.' All the courts before whom this problem has
been brought have determined likewise.
In Washington the state constitution determines the rights of
aliens in the state. It reads as follows:
"The ownership of lands by aliens, other than those who
in good faith' have declared their intention to become citiHubbardv. Goodwin, 3 Leigh, 492 (1832).
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zens of the United States, is prohibited in this state, except
where acquired by inheritance, under mortgage or in good
faith in the ordinary course of justice in the collection of
debts, and all conveyances of lands hereafter made to any
alien directly, or in trust for such alien, shall be void Provided, that the provisions of this section shall not apply to
lands containing valuable deposits of minerals, metals,
iron, coal or fire clay, and the necessary land for mills and
machinery to be used in the development thereof and the
manufacture of the products therefrom. Every corporation, the majority of the capital stock of which is owned
by aliens, shall be2 considered an alien for the purpose of
this prohibition."
In 1921 the legislature of the State of Washington passed what
was known as the Alien Land Bill.3 This act provides that no alien
who has not declared his intention of becoming a citizen, can hold
or take land. Land conveyed to an alien is to be forfeited to the
state. The act includes as "land" any interest therein for more
than ten years. Also any alien taking land under a mortgage or
in the collection of a debt cannot hold it for more than twelve years.
As a Japanese or Chinese cannot become a citizen under the United
States Code,4 limiting citizenship to "whites and negroes," this
act necessarily excludes them from taking or holding land.
In Terrace et al. v. Thompson,5 the constitutionality of the act
was questioned, especially in regards to an alleged conflict with
Article 1 of the Treaty with Japan6 which provided that citizens
of each contracting party "shall have liberty
to own or lease
and occupy homes, manufacturies, warehouses and shops,
to
lease land for residential and commercial purposes and generally
to do anything incident to or necessary for trade." The court
upheld the act on the ground that this treaty did not give the right
to lease agricultural lands as it was not incidental to trading purposes. This decision was later upheld by the Supreme Court of
the United States.7
In State v. O'Connell, it was sought to evade the statute by
means of a trust agreement under which O'Connell did not have
the use of the land, but had the right to the rents and profits and
any increase in value on resale. The statute in express terms only
prohibits conveyances for the use of aliens. However, the court
would not countenance such an evasion and held the land would
escheat to the state. This would appear to be in harmony with such
attempts at evasion of the common law.
2 WASH. CONST., Art. II, Sec.

33.

'Laws of '21, Chap. 50, p. 156. Rem. Comp. Stat., Sec. 10581
'U. S. Comp Stat. Sec. 4358.
274 Fed. 841 (1921).
37 Statutes at Large 1504.
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 68 L. Ed. 255. 44 Sup. Ct. 15 (1923)
S121 Wash. 542, 209 Pac. 865 (1922).
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9
In State v. Kurita,
a transaction consumated shortly before the
act was passed, was attacked under the act. In that case Kurita
had a contract to purchase some agricultural lands. Being unable
to meet payments, he assigned his contract to a corporation, which
in turn assigned to a second corporation. Kurita received in turn
a mortgage on the land. He was also a lessee of the second corporation. The court concluded that Kurita was not the owner and
the corporations merely dummies, but that the whole transaction
was made in good faith and could not be attacked by the state, and
that such cases must be determined on their individual facts. The
"twin case" to this, decided on the same day, is State v. Kusumi.10
On sinilar facts the court reached the same conclusion.
The forerunner of the first "loophole" in the act was In re Fujimoto," which held that a Japanese Iinor who was a citizen of the
United States by birth could not have his parents appointed his
guardians so as to control his property The argument of the
court was that a guardian has practically the same control over, and
use of, his ward's property as he would of his own. The California
court construing laws practically identical to our own, reached the
opposite conclusion in In re Tetsubumis Yanw's Estate.12 That
court's argument was that a guardian "neither acquires, possesses,
or enjoys the property belonging to his ward, in any accurate or
legal meaning of these terms." The Washington court critizes the
"academic" viewpoint as a detriment to the practical operation
of the act. Although the decision of the Washington court seems
the more practical of the two, it also seems to be a case of "judicial
legislation."
This "loophole" culminated in State v. Kosas.13 In this case title
was taken in the name of the Japanese child, who was a citizen of
the United States by birth. Originally title was held in the name
of his parents, but on passing of the Japanese Land Bill they conveyed the title as a gift to their son. Then trustees, who were
citizens of the United States, were appointed. Under the agreement the trustees were to receive a small compensation for acting
as such, and they, in turn, lred the child's parents to run a dairy
farm on the land. The court were of the opinion that the evidence
showed that bad faith and fraud were not present in this case and
held the trust was in favor of the child and not the parents. In
answer to the argument that this would allow many aliens to evade
the law they replied that each case must depend on its individual
facts. But it would seem that, if the court could not find fraud
in this case, they will not be able to find fraud in any similar case
and the statute may be evaded in tins manner *with impunity
The next "loophole" in the act was found in the case of State v.

' 136 Wash. 426, 240 Pac. 554 (1925).
10 136 Wash. 432, 240 Pac. 556 (1925).
"130 Wash. 188, 226 Pac. 505, 39 A. L. R. 937 (1924).
2188
Cal. 645, 206 Pac. 995 (1922).
11133 Wash. 442, 234 Pac. 5 (1925).
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Natsuhara,14 in which the state sought to escheat a leasehold interest in real estate owned by a Japanese. The lease had been
entered into about five years before the passage of the act and
was to extend about five years after its passage. The question
was whether the act would apply to such an interest. The court
held it would not, saying
"There is another reason why the construction contended for by the state should not be given, if the act is
reasonably susceptible of being construed as not to apply to
prior valid leases. If it should be given a construction as
applying to such leases, its constitutionality in this regard
would be a grave question. It would mean that property
lawfully acquire might, by act of the legislature subsequently passed, be taken from the lawful owner and given
to the state without compensation."
It was then argued that this taking of property might be justified under the police power, but, as the court pointed out, an
exercise of the police power may depreciate the value of land, but
no cases have held that it will justify the taking of valuable property legally acquired and giving it to the state without compensation.
The last "loophole" is brought out by State v McGonsgle. 5 The
defendant was charged with a conspiracy to violate the alien land
law The legal title to the land stood in the name of McGonigle.
Namba, a Japanese, had lived on the land and farmed it. The
Japanese raised and sold garden truck, giving receipts signed by
IVfcGonigle. The court held that there was not prima facie evidence of a conspiracy here, and on its face it seemed merely a
hiring by McGonigle to reside and till the soil and sell the produce.
This exception has been carried much further in California. In
the case of Ex parte Okahara,6 the facts were very similar to the
preceding Washington case, but there a contract was entered into.
The contract was termed a "contract of employment." The owner
of the land was termed "the employer" and Okahara "the contractor." The "contractor" was to clear the land and plant property to orchard, all trees being furnished by "employer."
The
"contractor" agreed to plant berry bushes between the trees, and
also some garden truck. The "employer" was to sell the crops and
the "contractor" was to receive 50 per cent of the net proceeds
derived from sale of said products. The "contract" further provided that "all crops
shall belong to, and be the property of
the employer", that the sole right of the "contractor" shall be to
the compensation to be paid by the "employer."
The contract also
provided that the "employer" might terminate the "contract" at
"1136 Wash. 437, 240 Pac. 557 (1925).
"6144 Wash. 252, 253 Pac. 655 (1927).
16191 Cal. 353, 216 Pac. 614 (1923).
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any time he was dissatisfied. The court held that this could not
be the basis for a crimnal prosecution. They said.
"It is true, as suggested by counsel for the state, that
the character of an instrument depends upon the intention
of the parties as disclosed by the language used to express
the intention of the parties and not by a particular name
given it by them. But it is also true that we are not permitted to make the instrument before us the basis of a
criminal action even though we may be able to concur in
the suggestion that it was artfully and adroitly drawn for
the purpose of avoiding a conflict with a penal statute of
the state."
Further, they said,
"
the instrument before us cannot be characterized
as a lease or transfer of any interest in property because
it lacks many of the essential elements of a lease, while on
the other hand it bears all the characteristics of an agreement of hiring."

In conclusion, it would seem that if the intention of the legislature in the act was to keep the agricultural land of the state in the
hands of citizens, that the act has failed. Through technicalities
and construction the courts have to a large extent "taken the teeth
out of the act."
JACK D. FREEATN.
INJUNCTIONS TO RESTRAIN THREATENED OR
IMPENDING CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
The general rule is always stated to be that an injunction will
not be granted to stay criminal or quasi-crininal proceedings.'
The original basis of the rule, it is quite generally agreed, was
founded upon the theory that to sustain a bill in equity to restrain
or relieve against proceedings for the punishment of offenses would
constitute an invasion of the law courts. 2 This theory was the
natural outgrowth of the lack of relation between equity and law
courts as they formerly existed in England.3 With the gradual ebb
in the jealousies and antagonisms between courts of law and of
'-Dalton Adding Machine Co. v. Va. State Corp. Comm., 236 U. S. 699, 37
Sup. Ct. 480, 59 L. Ed. 797 (1914) Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. City of
Charlottesville,42 Fed. (2nd) 88 (1930)
32 C. J. 279; 14 R. C. L. 426.
2Littleton v. Burgess, 14 Wyo. 173, 82 Pac. 864 (1905) Pomeroy Equitable Remedies (2nd Ed.), Sec. 2065, Clark, Equity (3rd Ed.), Sec. 245.
SZHuntworth v. Tanner 87 Wash. 670, 152 Pac. 523 (1915)
In Holderstaffe v. Saunders, 6 Mod. 12, Holt, Ch. J., said, "surely chancery will not
grant an injunction in a criminal matter under examination in this court,
and if they did this court would break it and protect any that would proceed in contempt of it."

